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We show in a two-period world with endogenous savings and two assets, one of them 
exhibiting a stochastic return, that an interest-adjusted income tax is optimal. This tax leaves a 
riskless component of interest income tax free and taxes the excess return with a special tax 
rate. There is no trade-off between risk allocation and efficiency in intertemporal 
consumption. Both goals are reached. As the resulting tax system divides income into three 
parts, the tax can also be called a Triple Income Tax. This distinction and a special tax rate on 
the excess return are necessary in order to have an optimal risk-shifting effect. 
JEL Code: H21. 
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ThereisanoldbutstillongoingdebateonthebesttaxsysteminmostOECDcoun-
tries. Especially in Germany and the U.S., there are proponents of consumption-
oriented taxation on the one hand and of comprehensive income taxation on the
other. In a major reform, the Nordic countries have implemented in the 1990s
a Dual Income Tax, which apportions total income into segmented tax bases of
labor and capital income (see, e.g., Słrensen, 1994). In all cases, however, this
debate fails to consider the effects of risk on personal income and therefore does
not deal with risky tax revenue. Consequently, the questions we want to answer
in this paper are: First, what is the optimal income taxation in case of aggregate
risk? Second, which tax system should therefore be implemented?
In a world without both uncertainty and distributional considerations the op-
timal tax structure for ￿nancing public expenditure is lump sum. In the case of
uncertainty about the individual wage rate ￿ so-called private risk, which is un-
systematic and can be insured against ￿ this statement does not hold. Eaton and
Rosen (1980) showed in their seminal paper that for a one-period world with en-
dogenous labor choice, an income tax with a strictly positive marginal tax rate
improves welfare. The government pools the private risk of all individuals and
uses a lump-sum transfer in order to return the deterministic tax revenue. The
income tax takes on the function of a social insurance scheme against private risk.
Varian (1980) showed similar effects for a two-period world where the households
work for a known wage rate and have to choose between consumption and sav-
ings. In his analysis, individuals face private risk because of uncertainty about the
best investment portfolio.
The risk category we are interested in, however, is aggregate risk. This risk is
systematic and hits all agents at the same time and in the same manner. There-
fore, no insurance is possible, but incurring this risk pays out a risk premium.
Amazingly, there are only a few contributions to this topic.
Richter and Wiegard (1991) examine a model with endogenous savings. In
their two-period model the households have inelastic labor supply in period zero
and divide their exogenous labor income between consumption and savings. Con-
1sumption in the following period is ￿nanced by savings and a stochastic inter-
est income. Richter and Wiegard show that a tax on this risky interest income
improves welfare under certain conditions ￿ even in a world with exogenous la-
bor supply. The optimal tax rate is a trade-off between ef￿ciency and insurance.
Therefore, it depends on the elasticity of current consumption with respect to a
compensated relative change of the tax rate. Further, they show that a consump-
tion tax cannot achieve this insurance function. Related studies have been done
by Richter (1992). He examines the portfolio choice decision in a two-asset world
with one asset exhibiting a stochastic return and one safe asset. Richter develops
an optimal elasticity rule for the taxation of asset returns and demonstrates that a
cash-￿ow tax is not optimal if tax rates are not differentiated.
Unfortunately, these papers assume risk neutrality in public consumption.
Hence, they collapse to the case of private risk and are limited in their statements
concerning risky tax bases.
Christiansen (1993), instead, points out some optimal tax rules for portfolio
choice in the case of risk aversion in public consumption, but his approach cannot
be linked to the tax systems mentioned above.
Nevertheless, all these papers suggest that in case of uncertainty a consumption
tax is always inferior to an income tax. This is because an income tax provides
superior insurance by taxing capital income, and the sacri￿ce of a distorted in-
tertemporal consumption decision is more than compensated by the reduction of
risk. However, looking at the capital taxation used, in all the papers the return on
each single asset is liable to one separate tax rate. Thus, they are not able to deal
with risk effects separately, as we point out in the next section.
We show in our paper that the sacri￿ce of ef￿ciency is not necessary. First,
by using an adequately de￿ned tax system, we can achieve both insurance and in-
tertemporal ef￿ciency. Therefore, we use and extend Sandmo’s (1977) approach,
which interprets assets as goods and assets’ returns as their prices, in order to es-
tablish an analogy to portfolio choice and consumption theory. Second, we are
able to show that the resulting optimal tax scheme is a modern form of consump-
tion taxation. Precisely, we will get a kind of consumption-oriented income tax
2with interest adjustment (see, e.g., Rose, 1999, pp. 35), which introduces an ad-
ditional tax base, being liable to a separated tax rate: the risk premium. We can
state that such a consumption tax is able to insure against risk to capital income in
an optimal manner.
Amazingly, Croatia implemented a very similar tax system in 1994 for some
other reasons (see Rose and Wiswesser, 1998, Rose, 1999). However, it did not
deal with the risk issue and set a tax rate on excess capital returns equal to zero.
Moreover, Croatia re-reformed its tax system in 2000 towards the traditional com-
prehensive taxation approach.
Even better ￿ts the shareholder income tax, which has been enacted in Norway
in 2006, and which replaces both the Norwegian RISK and its split model. The
amendment to the Dual Income Tax identi￿es the risk premium as additional tax
base, and taxes these returns with a combination of the corporate tax and the per-
sonal capital income tax.1 This implies that the effective tax rate roughly equals
the top marginal tax rate on labor income, but also that it is not chosen indepen-
dently. Again, the reasoning behind this tax reform does neglect the risk issue, we
are interested in, and solely focus on preventing tax-avoidance.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the model
and examine the household choice; section 3 discusses the optimal tax structure
for a welfare maximum. The paper closes with some conclusions.
2 The Model and Household Choice
In order to focus on the effects of aggregate risk, we keep the model as simple, but
as general, as possible. Therefore, we use a two-period model without any bequest
motive. There is a homogeneous individual, receiving exogenous labor income y
in period 1 and dividing it into ￿rst-period consumption ct−1 and savings st−1.
Assuming that labour supply and wages are perfectly inelastic, is very restrictive,
1See Słrensen (2005), who shows that the shareholder tax is neutral in various aspects, but
who does not consider the insurance effect and optimal risk diversi￿cation. Moreover, in the
Słrensen-setting it is not possible to analyze the Musgrave substitution effect of a net tax.
3because it implies that there is a state-independent lump-sum tax available, but
it allows to concentrate onto the effects of (risky) capital taxation, in which we
are especially interested. We want to focus onto the new view of risk as a ‘bad,’
exhibiting a negative price, and the insurance effect of the risk tax. Extending
the analysis for endogenous labor supply is possible, but does not alter the results
concerning the risk part. Therefore, it is left for further research, because this
implies several new trade-offs and heavily increases complexity.
Savings can be invested in an asset A0 with a certain return r > 0 and in a risky
asset A1 with a stochastic return ￿ x ≥ −1. We assume E[￿ x] > r. Savings are the
only source of consumption in the second period.
The government has to ￿nance a public good g in the second period and can
use both a proportional wage tax tL in the ￿rst period, and a tax on capital income.
For capital-income taxation we use a two-part interest income tax. We tax the
riskless return r on both assets at a rate t0 and the excess return ￿ x−r at a rate t1,
and we assume full loss offset. If the realization of the excess return is negative,
this loss will lead to a tax refund of t1·(￿ x−r).
The motivation for the design of the capital tax system is as follows: The in-
vestor does not invest in assets in order to own the assets. On the one hand, she
makes investments in order to shift resources into the future for ￿nancing future
consumption. However, postponing consumption creates some kind of disutility
as long as her marginal rate of time preference is positive, and she has therefore to
be compensated for giving up present consumption. The price of this compensa-
tion for resource shifting equals the riskless rate of return and is paid out by both
the riskless asset and the risky one. On the other hand, the investor can expand her
income for future consumption by buying asset A1 and incurring risk. Risk creates
disutility, and for incurring this risk the investor receives a risk premium. Thus,
there are two ￿goods￿ traded in our economy, namely, (present versus future) con-
sumption with a net price of r, and a ￿bad￿ called risk with price ￿ x−r.2 After
realization of risk, this price for risk equals the excess return ￿x−r, which can
be negative in bad states of the world. Hence, the investor gets additional (risk)
2This interpretation can be seen as an extension of the Sandmo (1977) approach.
4income (￿ x−r)·A1 according to her risk preferences. This income is positive in
expected values.
Taken together, the prices for resource shifting and risk are liable to two sep-
arate tax rates under our tax system, whereas in most earlier papers the assets’
returns are liable to asset-speci￿c tax rates. This means for the risky asset that
the prices mentioned are mixed and taxed at one rate. If so, however, no separate
treatment of risk is possible. 3
Savings can now be written as st−1 = A0 +A1 = (1−tL)y−ct−1. Consump-





assume that the representative investor is risk-averse in both private and public
consumption and her von Neumann￿Morgenstern utility function takes the form
W = E[U(ct−1, ￿ ct, ￿ g)] with Uc > 0, Ucc < 0, Ug > 0, Ugg < 0.
Furthermore, weassumethatfutureconsumptionandthepublicgoodare(weakly)
complements: Uctg,Ugct ≥ 0. It seems to be reasonable that (aggregate) public
consumption is valued more, if there is higher private consumption, when one
thinks of g as cultural supply (theater, opera,...), but also as interior and legal se-
curity, or infrastructure. However, this assumption implies that the optimal public
spending is pro-cyclical.
In this model, the government chooses the tax rates, and the tax revenue is
used entirely to ￿nance the public good in period 1. Therefore, the probability
distribution of ￿ g is also an instrument variable of the government.
The household maximizes her expected utility W for given tax rates by choos-
ing her optimal ￿rst-period consumption ct−1 and her optimal savings A0+A1 =
(1−tL)y−ct−1 with respect to the budget constraint. She does not anticipate the
effect of her saving behavior on the level of the public good. Inserting the budget
3Hence, the idea of separated tax rates is to have enough instruments for pursuing two goals,
namely, optimal resource allocation as well as ef￿cient risk diversi￿cation.
4All variables in the paper indicated with a tilde depend on the risky return ￿x, and are therefore
itself stochastic.


















−E[Uct ·[1+r(1−t0)]] = 0, (2)
¶W
¶A1
= (1−t1)E[Uct ·(￿ x−r)] = 0. (3)
The optimal values of c, A1, and s are denoted ct−1 = ct−1(t0,t1,tL), A1 =








−1 = r(1−t0). (4)
Equation (3) indicates that our tax system does not distort portfolio choice, as
the FOC is equal to the optimality condition in the case of no taxation.
Lemma 1 The tax ratet1 on the excess return ￿ x−r does not affect overall savings
st−1(t0,t1,tL), as ¶ct−1/¶t1 =0. Furthermore,t1 hasonlyaMusgrave-substitution
effect on A1, and ¶A1/¶t1 = A1/(1−t1).
Proof: See Appendix.
This result corresponds to the result for taxing capital gains in Sandmo (1969,
section 8) and is similar to the portfolio choice result for a net tax in the case of
several risky assets (Sandmo, 1977). By investing more in the risky asset accord-
ing to ¶A1/¶t1 = A1/(1−t1) and diminishing the investment in the riskless asset
by the same amount, and therefore keeping both ￿rst-period and second-period
consumption constant, the tax rate change in t1 does not change the expected util-
ity of the household.
3 Optimal Taxes on Interest Income
The government collects tax revenue not only from capital taxation in period t,
but also from the wage tax in that period. However, all spending for the public
6good takes place in period t only. Hence, we assume that the tax revenue of the
wage tax in period t −1 is invested entirely in the safe asset. 5 Thus, in period t,
the government’s budget restriction can be written
￿ g = (1+r)tL·y+t1(￿ x−r)·A1(t0,t1,tL)+t0r·[(1−tL)y−ct−1(t0,t1,tL)].
The government chooses now the tax rates and the public good g in order to max-
imize the social welfare function
W = E

U(ct−1(t0,t1,tL), ￿ ct(t0,t1,tL), ￿ g)






U(ct−1(.), ￿ ct(.),(1+r)tL·y+t1(￿ x−r)·A1(.)+t0r·[(1−tL)y−ct−1(.)])

. (5)










































Then, we can conclude from using (9) and simpli￿ed versions of (6) and (8) :
Proposition 1 An optimal income tax system in the case of exogenous labor in-
come and risky returns to at least one asset does not tax the riskless rate of return
(t0 = 0). The optimal tax rate on the excess return ￿ x−r is strictly positive and in
5This may be interpreted as a shortcut to an overlapping-generations model, where the govern-
ment provides an old-generation-speci￿c public good and where the riskless rate of return equals
the population growth in steady state. See, e.g., Sandmo (1985), section 7.
7the open interval t1 ∈ (0,1) if the households are risk-averse in both private and
public consumption. The wage tax is used to equate marginal utility of public and
private consumption in period 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
If t1 is set optimally, we have Cov(Uct, ￿ x) = Cov(Ug, ￿ x). The intuition is
straightforward: ex post, resources should be ef￿ciently allocated between pub-
lic and private consumption. Unless one makes special assumptions, this involves
adjusting both private and public consumption, given the realization of the shock.
Hence, as long as the households are risk-averse in both private and public con-
sumption, theriskmustbediversi￿edonbothtypesofconsumption. Inourmodel,
this can be achieved ef￿ciently by using the risk tax on the excess return. 6
The diversi￿cation depends on the strength of the risk aversion in private con-
sumption relative to that in public consumption. Therefore, the tax rate t1 depends
on this relative strength: The higher the risk aversion in private consumption rel-
ative to that in public consumption, the higher the tax rate on the excess return
￿ x−r. The intuition is as follows. The more disutility in private consumption,
relative to disutility in public consumption, is caused by risk, the more risk should
be transferred to public consumption.
As the government returns the risk to the households by providing a public
good, our result is general and independent of any assumption about whether the
government can deal better with risk than the capital market. Furthermore, be-
cause it provides an additional asset (the public good), which cannot be provided
by the capital market, the tax on the risk component is not neutral for the gov-
ernment and achieves positive tax revenue in expected values. Hence, Gordon’s
(1985) neutrality result does not hold in our model. 7
6Another possible way to vary public-goods provision is using debt policy. However, in view of
the problems of several EU countries in ful￿lling the Maastricht criteria and the huge household
de￿cit in the U.S., it seems doubtful that most governments can afford to run large additional
de￿cits in order to secure the optimal provision of the public good ￿ but this might be necessary
in case of large shocks.
7See Kaplow (1994), p. 795.
8Bulow and Summers (1984) state that most risk is embedded in economic de-
preciations that are not liable to taxation. Thus, the government will not partic-
ipate in the risk, and there is no insurance effect of taxation. This may be true
for corporate taxation, using statutory depreciation rates. However, we tax ex post
capital income, where the risky rate of return depends on the economic value of
the underlying ￿rm.8 Thus, the government fully participates in all income risk,
and the critique of Bulow and Summers (1984) does not apply.
Moreover, we can discuss two limiting cases, if we relax our assumption that
the household is neither risk neutral in public consumption nor risk neutral in
private consumption. If we assume both risk neutrality in public consumption
(Ugg =0)and thatthe marginalutilityof futureconsumption isindependent ofsto-
chastic￿uctuationsinthelevelofthepublicgood( Uctg =0), wegetasspecialcase
t1 = 1. All risk is concentrated in public consumption, because it does not create
any disutility in public consumption. 9 This is in accordance with the Arrow￿Lind
theorem, where the government can diversify aggregate risk perfectly.
The other (even more) extreme result, t1 = 0, is achieved if we assume risk
neutrality in private future consumption (Uctct = 0) and that the marginal utility in
public consumption does not respond to variations in second-period consumption
(Ugct = 0). The simplest way to implement such risk preferences is to use a quasi-
linear utility function with U = v(ct−1)+ ￿ ct +h(￿ g), where hg > 0, hgg < 0. If so,
the household is willing to bear risk at no cost, and it is optimal to allocate all the
risk to private consumption.
The result t1 ∈ (0,1) can also change drastically, if we relax our assumptions
Uctg,Ugct ≥ 0, and assume instead that public and private consumption are sub-
stitutes. Hence, Uctg,Ugct ≤ 0. In this case, public spending has an additional
insurance effect, because public spending can compensate for lower private con-
sumption.
If either this effect is strong (|Uctg,Ugct| large) or risk aversion is low








¶￿ x < 0 in case of
8Assume asset 1 as a stock. Then its return ￿ x re￿ects the ￿rm’s ￿uctuating value.
9Analytically, Ugg = 0 implies Cov(Ug, ￿ x) = 0, and from (20), this requires Cov (Uct, ￿ x) = 0.
The latter is solely possible in case of t1 = 1, as long as Uctct < 0 and Uctg = 0.
9t1 < 0, and the covariances are still equated. The government then subsidizes the
investment in the risky asset.
The intuition is as follows: Given the cases above, the government would like
to spend more in the bad states of the world and optimally spends less, when
the economy is booming. Given the tax instruments in our model, this can be
reached ef￿ciently by introducing a subsidy on risk income (￿ x−r)·A1. How-
ever, the cases of public spending, in which this result applies, are limited. The
intuitive idea of unemployment insurance or other low-income related ￿nancial
transfers does not work, because all these transfers substitute income in private
consumption, and, hence, reallocate the aggregate risk directly to households’ in-
come. Unfortunately, Gordon’s neutrality would then apply. One possible setting,
which can instead ensure the result above, is public health care for low-income
earners or unemployed, which is provided in the US (e.g., medicaid).
Returning to our original assumptions, we can ￿nally state:
Proposition 2 If an interest-adjusted income tax is implemented, taxing the ex-
cess return according to Proposition 1 [t 1 ∈(0;1)] and letting the riskless compo-
nent of interest be tax-free (t 0 = 0), an ef￿cient risk allocation is achieved without
disturbing the intertemporal consumption decision. There is no trade-off between
risk and ef￿ciency in allocation. The marginal rate of time preference equals the
riskless rate of return (r = r).
Proof: From (4), the marginal rate of time preference is r = r ·(1−t0). For
t0 = 0, r = r. At the optimum, the marginal rate of time preference is then
independent of the tax rates, and the intertemporal consumption decision is not
distorted. Additionally, Cov(Uct, ￿ x) = Cov(Ug, ￿ x) assures ef￿cient risk allocation.
￿ 2
As mentioned above, the literature shows that consumption-oriented taxation
cannot achieve the insurance function of a traditional income tax in the case of
risky capital income. But is it true that an income tax always yields better results?
Examining our analysis, this view must be taken with care.
10We use a proportional wage tax on exogenous labor income in the ￿rst pe-
riod. The riskless rate of return on savings is tax-free, whereas the excess return
(supernormal pro￿ts) is taxed at a special rate. This tax scheme equals a modi-
￿ed consumption-oriented income tax with interest adjustment. 10 Therefore, we
have a consumption tax, which optimally provides insurance against risky capital
income and simultaneously avoids a distortion in the intertemporal consumption
decision.
This tax scheme is an extension of the Dual Income Tax approach and can be
called a Triple Income Tax, as we divide the full income into three different parts.
The excess return (or risk premium) is one of them. This distinction is necessary
for achieving an optimal risk allocation by taxation: 11
Proposition 3 In the case of aggregate risk the optimal tax system is a Triple
Income Tax, which apportions overall income into three separate tax bases: labor
income, risklessreturntooverallsavings, andriskincome. Thelastincomeequals
the excess return on risky investment. Such a tax system generalizes the Dual
Income Tax approach to include risk effects.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. On the one hand, it is
optimal to diversify the aggregate risk between private and public consumption.
On the other hand, risk shifting has negative welfare effects by disturbing the in-
tertemporal consumption decision, if we tax the risky asset at only one rate. In this
case, there is a trade-off and the optimal tax rate depends on the strength of these
effects. If we instead tax the excess return at a special rate, then the tax system is
well de￿ned and the trade-off can be avoided. Thus, we reach both optimal risk
allocation and ef￿ciency in intertemporal consumption simultaneously.
However, we have to note that the proposed tax system cannot implement a
First-best optimum. The tax system does better than other income or consumption
10A consumption-oriented income tax with interest adjustment taxes the overall labor income
and tax-exempts interest income. For excess returns in capital income a tax with the same tax rate
as for labor income is possible. See, e.g., Rose (1999), pp. 35.
11Calling a tax system a Triple Income Tax, where one tax rate equals nil, seems not to be very
intuitive at ￿rst sight. However, the tax system is also suitable in the case of an extended model
using endogenous labor choice. Then, all three tax rates are positive.
11taxes, and it is superior to a state-independent lump-sum tax. The reason is that
it can guarantee an ex-ante optimal risk diversi￿cation at no allocation costs, but
ex post the risk sharing between different states is linear, due to the fact that the
risk tax is proportional to the realization of the risky return ￿x. Thus, although we
can mimic a state-dependent lump sum tax, we cannot ensure an ex post Pareto-
optimal risk diversi￿cation ￿ at least not without restricting the utility function to
special classes.
Last mentioned should be that the results above can also be used to give an-
other justi￿cation for the Norwegian shareholder income tax. This tax is (nearby)
equivalent to the risk tax in this paper, and thus can be seen as extending the Dual
Income Tax towards a Triple Income Tax, because risk (or the return to risky en-
trepreneur activities) is identi￿ed as an additional, independent source of income.
However, the effective Norwegian shareholder tax rate is not independent, and de-
termined only by anti-tax avoidance considerations. If the tax policy is extended
to incorporate risk diversi￿cation and insurance issues, this tax rate should get
more ‘slackness.’
4 Conclusions
We have shown that an interest-adjusted income tax can guarantee a welfare max-
imum in a two-period world with two assets, one of them exhibiting a stochastic
return. The excess return must be taxed separately, and possible losses in this tax
base must be subsidized. In the case of risk aversion in public consumption, we
have an inner optimum with t1 ∈ (0,1), because the risk must be diversi￿ed on
both consumption types in order to have an optimal risk allocation.
Assuchatax systemis akindof indirectconsumption taxation, weshowed that
a consumption tax is able to insure against risky interest income. Furthermore, the
tax system can be called a Triple Income Tax, because it uses three segmented tax
bases. This extension of the Dual Income Tax is due to considering risk effects on
personal income and tax revenue explicitly. Although not done in the paper, it is
straightforward to show that these results also prevail in a multiasset world.
12This tax system has an interesting advantage from a political point of view.
In public opinion there is usually major support for taxing supernormal pro￿ts
in capital income, whereas, at least in Germany, such capital gains are mostly
tax-free at the moment. Now, this paper shows that taxing excess returns can be
done in a welfare-enhancing manner without affecting the utility of private con-
sumption. Therefore, the risk tax creates no incentives for households to engage
in tax planning. However, a disadvantage of our tax system is that individuals
still have an incentive to declare labor income as preferred taxed riskless capital
income in order to avoid taxes. This problem is the same as in case of a (standard)
Dual Income Tax with separate tax rates for labor and capital income (see, e.g.,
Słrensen, 1994, 2005), whereas, as mentioned above, the incentives to tax avoid-
ance in the risk tax (shareholder income tax) may be much less than thought at
￿rst glance. The reason is that the risk tax not only has the neutrality properties,
shown in Słrensen (2005), but also does, from the perspective of an household,
neither affect the budget constraint nor private utility.
Related work can be done in a multiasset world with a ￿xed amount of savings.
In such a world, Richter (1992) and Christiansen (1993) show that there is a trade-
off between risk allocation and optimal portfolio choice. If the same tax system
is introduced as in this paper, this trade-off should also be overcome, and under
special conditions an ex post optimal solution can be achieved. 12 Further work
could also examine a multiasset world with endogenous savings and labor supply.
Another interesting topic emerges if we look at further work concerning het-
erogeneous households. The taxation of the excess return affects utility solely
by public consumption. Despite this, the risk tax can be used for redistribution,
if low-income households have higher preferences for the public good than high-
incomehouseholds. Here, redistributionistobethoughtofasenhancingtheutility
of low-income households, which is possible by increasing the risk tax and creat-
ing higher tax revenue in expected values. Contrary to the traditional literature on
redistribution, we get an instrument that avoids any trade-off between ef￿ciency
and redistribution, but society has to pay for it with increased risk in consumption.
12See Hilgers and Schindler (2004) for a ￿rst analysis concerning ￿rst-best optimality.
135 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Let pr = 1+r(1−t0) and pA = (1−t1)(￿ x−r). Totally





















































































and, hence, ¶A1/¶t1 = A1/(1−t1) from Cramer’s rule. 2
Proof of Proposition 1 In proving Proposition 1 we use (9) with the ￿rst-order




= 0, and (14)
E[Ug−Uct]·[1+r(1−t0)]y−E[Ug]·t0r·
¶ct−1
¶tL = 0. (15)











14A household’s budget constraint can be displayed as
￿ ct + pr·ct−1 = (1−t1)(￿ x−r)A1+ pr·(1−tL)·y, (17)
where pr = 1+r(1−t0) is the price of present consumption, pr ·y is the value of
endowment, and I = pr·(1−tL)·y is full (lump-sum) income after wage tax.
Thus, ¶ct−1/¶t0 = (¶ct−1/¶pr)(−r), and ¶I/¶tL = −pr·y. The wage tax has a
pureincomeeffectonly, aslongaslaborsupplyisexogenous. Hence, ¶ct−1/¶tL =
(¶ct−1/¶I)·(¶I/¶tL). Using the Slutsky equation for ¶ct−1/¶pr and endowment
effects in (16), and collecting terms, the income effects cancel out, and we are left






and therefore unambiguously t0 = 0, because Sct−1ct−1 < 0 as long as the tax on
riskless return is not another lump-sum tax.
For t0 = 0, from (6) and (8) then follows E[Uct] = E[Ug]. Using the ￿rst-order
condition (3) of the household problem and (9), we can write
E[Uct ·(￿ x−r)] = 0 = E[Ug·(￿ x−r)]. (19)
As E[Y ·Z] = E[Y]·E[Z]+Cov(Y,Z) and E[Uct] = E[Ug], this expression can
be simpli￿ed to
Cov(Uct, ￿ x) = Cov(Ug, ￿ x). (20)
Ift1 ≤0, resources have to be paid out to the households if ￿x increases, because
the risk tax is in fact a subsidy. Thus, we have ¶ct/¶x>0 and ¶g/¶x≤0. Together



















This implies Cov(Uct, ￿ x) < 0, but Cov(Ug, ￿ x) > 0. By a similar reasoning, in
case of t1 ≥ 1, we get Cov(Uct, ￿ x) > 0, but now Cov(Ug, ￿ x) < 0, as more than the
additional income is taxed away.
15In both cases, covariances cannot be equated and equation (20) is not ful￿lled.
Thus, an optimal taxation of the excess return requires t1 ∈ (0,1). 2
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